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POLICEMEN'S INDEMNIFICATION STATUTE

AFTER

satisfying a judgment entered against him in a suit for
false arrest' John Gaca, a Chicago policeman, brought suit
L
against the City of Chicago, under the terms of the "policemen's
indemnification statute," 2 for reimbursement of the sums so expended. Against a challenge by the City of the statute's constitutionality, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute was constitutional, and that Gaca was entitled to indemnification.3
At common law, municipal immunity from liability for injuries
to the person or property of individuals caused by agents of the
municipality in the performance of "governmental" functions was
firmly established. 4 This immunity was steadily contracted by the
enactment of statutes reducing the scope of the common law exemption. In 1931, the Illinois General Assembly imposed direct
liability on all municipalities for the negligent operation of motor
vehicles by members of a municipal fire department, acting within
the scope of their duties as firemen. 5 Twelve years later, the General Assembly passed a similar law regarding policemen. 6 And in
1945, the law was so amended that all municipalities whose populations exceed 500,000 were required to indemnify any municipal
police officer who satisfied a judgment resulting from injuries to
the person or property of another inflicted by the officer while en1. Marian Mallory and Edward Mallory v. John Gaca and Alvin Goldstine,
No. 45 S 23422, Superior Court of Cook County.
2. Gaca v. The City of Chicago, 411 Ill. 146, 103 N.E.2d 617 (1952). ILL. REv.
STAT. c. 24, §1-15 (1951): "Indemnification for injuries caused by a policeman. In
case any injury to the person or property is caused by a member of the police department of a municipality having a population of 500,000 or over, while the member
is engaged in the performance of his duties as' policeman, and without the contributory negligence of the injured person or the owner, the municipality in whose
behalf the member of the municipal police department is performing his duties as
policeman shall indemnify the policeman for any judgment recovered against him as
a result of such injury, except where the injury results from the wilful misconduct
of the policeman."
3. justices Schaefer and Hershey dissenting.
460, 91 N.E.2d 401 (1950) ; Taylor
4. Johnston v. City of East Moline, 405 Ill.

v. The City of Berwyn. 372 Ill. 124, 22 N.E2d 930 (1939); Green, Municipal
Liability for Torts, 38 ILL. L. REv. 355, (1944) ; Comment Tort Claims against the
State of Illinois and its Subdivisions, 47 Nw. U.L. Rav. 914 (1953). This immunity has been interpreted as including within it the activities of the police department. City of Chicago v. Williams. 182 111. 135, 55 N.E. 123 (1899); Evans v.
223, 83 N.E. 223 (1907).
City of Kankakee, 231 Ill.
5. ILL. REv. STAT. c. 24, §1-13 (1951).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 24, §1-15 (1943) : "In case any injury to the person or property of another is caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a member
of the police department of a municipality having a population of 500,000 or over,
while the member is engaged in the performance of his duties a, policeman and
without the contributory negligence of the injured person or the owner of the
injured property, . . . the municipality only . . . shall he liable for that injury."
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gaged in the performance of his duties, provided that the injuries
were not the result of the officer's willful misconduct.7 It was

under this amendment that Gaca brought his action.
The City contended" that the statute violated the Illinois Con-

stitution in that it constituted a special or local law granting an
exclusive privilege or immunity to Chicago policemen, 9 and that it

imposed a special burden on the City without imposing a similar
burden on other municipalities. Since Chicago is the only city in
Illinois with a population in excess of 500,000,10 and, since there is
only one other city which might foreseeably reach the requisite
size,1 1 there can be little doubt that the statute was intended to
apply exclusively to Chicago. But as interpreted by the majority
of the court, the classification on the basis of population in the

present statute is not unreasonable, 12 because Chicago's heavy
vehicular and pedestrian traffic, the prevailing criminal elements,
and the general social problems are conditions not found elsewhere
in the state. Mr. Justice Schaefer's dissenting opinion, however,

points out that criminal elements and social problems are not
peculiar to Chicago, and that heavy traffic, while related to the size
of a city, is in no way related to a statute providing indemnification

for a police officer held liable for false arrest. It would seem that
the dissent represents the better view, and that the statute repre7. See note 2 supra.
8. While a city is not required to indemnify officers for injuries which are the
product of their willful misconduct (see note-2 sirpra), this argument was not
pursued by the City on appeal because of the failure of the jury to return a finding
of malice when the question was presented to them in the lower court (see note 1
supra) in the instructions, and since "willfilness" is not a necessary element of false
arrest. Shelton v. Barry, 328 Ill. App. 497, 66 N.E.2d 697 (1946). And see note 33
infra.
9. ILL. CONST. Art IV., §22: "The General Assembly shall not pass local or
special laws in any of the following cases, that is to say: For ...
granting to any
corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or
franchise whatever." Cf. §34, infra note 13.
10. According to the 1950 census established by the United States Bureau of
Census, Chicago had a population of 3,606,436. New York World Telegram, 1951
World Almanac.
11. Peoria is the second largest municipality in Illinois with a population of
111,523. Ibid.
12. Laws are not invalid merely because they apply only to a particular class,
provided that the law affects all members of the class in the same manner [Kloss v.
Suburban Cook County Tuberculosis Sanitarium District, 404 Ill. 87, 88 N.E.2d
89 (1949) ; Hansen v. Raleigh, 391 Il. 536, 63 N.E.2d 851 (1945)], and the classification itself is not arbitrary [Bagdonas v. Liberty Land & Investment Co., 309 Ill.
103, 140 N.E. 49 (1923); L'Hote v. Village of Milford, 212 I11. 418, 72 N.E. 399
(1904)]. Classification is said to be reasonable if it is based upon some substantial difference of situation or of conditions bearing a reasonable relation to the
purposes and objects to be attained by the legislation. Giebelhausen v. Daley, 407
Ill. 25, 95 N.E.2d 84 (1950); Hunt v. County of Cook, 398 Ill. 412, 76 N.E.2d 48
(1947).
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sents a thinly veiled effort to by-pass the Chicago City Council in

enacting special legislation for the City of Chicago. 13
Counsel for the City presented an additional argument not discussed in the opinion'- 4-that the statute deprived the City of due
process of law,' 5 since the statute makes no provision for notifying
the City of the action against the policeman. Thus it is possible that
the City may be called upon to indemnify a police officer for a judgment secured in an action of which it had no notice at all. Ad-

mittedly the Chicago Municipal Code provision that policemen who
are parties defendant in any suit may receive free legal advice and
service from the Corporation Counsel's Office renders this quite
unlikely. 16 Such probabilities, however, are not a proper test of
due process; and, even though the City actually received notice, if
the statute were construed to permit imposition of liability without
notice, the validity of the law may be seriously questioned.' 7 However, if indemnity, as used in the statute, is given its ordinary
meaning,' 8 and the well established rules of indemnity law are
applied, the City, as an indemnitor, will not be bound to reimburse
any officer unless it has received proper notice of the pendency of
the action.' 9 This view would seem to be the proper one, and, if it
is adopted, the due process argument falls. A contrary interpreta13. The majority, however, concluded that the statute was a general law, thus
avoiding the application of ILL. CONST. Art IV, §34, requiring the submission of
local laws to the voters of the municipality affected.
A final contention made against the validity of the statute was that it constituted
a tax upon a municipal corporation or the inhabitants thereof for corporate purposes
and therefore violated §10 of Art. IX of the Illinois Constitution, prohibiting the
imposition of such taxes by the General Assembly, unless such taxes are for the
general welfare and security of the State. Littell v. City of Peoria, 374 I1. 344,
396, 184 N.E. 610 (1933).
29 N.E.2d 533 (1940); People v. City of Chicago, 351 Ill.
The majority replied that police protection in Chicago was a matter of general
concern to the entire state, and that this statute was designed to increase the
efficiency of such protection.
14. Brief and Argument for Appellant, pp. 17-21, Gaca v. City of Chicago, supra
note 2.
15. ILL. CONST. Art. II, §2: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.'
16. Municipal Code of Chicago, c. 6.
121, 125 N.E. 757 (1919). In the Gaca case, how17. People v. Marquis, 291 Ill.
ever, the City had actual notice of the suit. Whether or not a municipal corporation
is protected by the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions is another
question. It has been contended that a city is not a person within the meaning of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 5 McQumLLN, MuNiciPAL. CoRPORATIONS §19.11 (3d ed. 1949). Thus it has been held that a city may not plead
lack of due process against the state, when the reliance was upon the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection. Shelby v. City of Pensacola, 112 Fla. 584, 151 So. 53
46, 86 N.E. 683 (1908) (the
(1933). But cf. Sturges v. City of Chicago, 237 Ill.
City of Chicago was allowed to raise a due process argument under the federal
and state constitutions).
18. Words having definite and technical meanings will usually be interpreted
in the light of such meaning. People v. Friederich, 385 Ill. 175, 52 N.E.2d 120
334, 126 N.E. 189 (1920).
(1943); Murrell v. Industrial Commission, 291 Ill.
602, 65 N.E.2d 364 (1946).
19. Sanitary District v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 392 Ill.
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tion of the statute might provide another opportunity for the City
to attack it on constitutional grounds.
Aside from its constitutionality, the statute itself provides no
20
It
guarantee of protection for the victim of police misconduct.
undertakes only to provide for repayment to the policeman of a
judgment, 2 1 not to provide funds for the satisfaction of the injured
party's claim. A "judgment-proof" policeman could incur no loss,
and, under the terms of the statute, there would be nothing for
which the City could indemnify him. 22 However, the Chicago City
Council has amended the Municipal Code so that the Corporation
Counsel may certify such judgments for police misconduct to the
city comptroller for payment by the City to the injured party if, in
his opinion, the police officer was not guilty of "willful misconduct"
and an appeal is not justified. 23 The primary purpose of the ordinance was to avoid circuity of action which would necessarily
follow if a police officer were first required to pay the judgment
and then sue the City for indemnification. As a result of the ordinance, his eligibility for indemnity does not require him to first
liquidate his assets or subject his property to levy or garnishment.
Another result of the ordinance is that the injured party looks to
the City for compensation, rather than to the police officer, and
may thus recover even though the judgment were otherwise uncollectible from a "judgment-proof" policeman. The City may participate in settling claims against officers in advance of trial, although
a formal judgment against the policeman must be entered. No
judgment is entered against the City.
The passage of the ordinance raises two serious questions: Is
Chicago by means of this ordinance waiving its immunity from
liability? And if so, can a city in Illinois validly waive its immunity? The ordinance does not allow injured parties to bring
suit against the City, and in that respect the City still retains its
immunity. But the immunity as it has traditionally existed was
immunity from liability, 24 and not merely immunity from suit.
Since the City of Chicago has assumed the obligation of paying
20. Any protection for the injured person under the statute is indirect. For
instance, a police office might be more prompt in satisfying a judgment against
him, or he may even borrow the money to pay the judgment, inasmuch as he knows
that regardless of the extent of his loss he will be able to recover it from the
City of Chicago under the Statute.
21. The statute also offers opportunity for collusion between an officer and a
supposedly "injured" person. The machinery for fraudulent suits is within the
control of the policeman, and there is little likelihood of discovery. While such
cases would doubtless never be a major problem, the possibility should not be
overlooked.
22. Erickson v. Fitzgerald, 342 I1. App. 223, 96 N.E.2d 382 (1950).
23. Municipal Code of Chicago c. 6, §2(d), as amended April 28, 1952. City
Journal of Chicago, p. 2306.
24. See note 4 supra.
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these judgments, it would appear that such assumption of liability
is equivalent to a partial waiver of its immunity.
In other states, a municipality's right to immunity from liability
for torts committed by its agents acting in the performance of
governmental functions is a right which cannot be waived by its
officers. 25 The Illinois courts apparently have not directly passed
upon the validity of such municipal largess, but the necessary implication in Thomas v. Broadlands Community ConsolidatedSchool
District Number 20126 was that, in the absence of statute, tort immunity can only be waived by the municipal corporation's obtaining
insurance. New York has adopted a different view in Evans v.
Berry,21 but there a state statute specifically allowed cities to compromise claims which were equitably payable by the city, although
not constituting legally binding obligations. 28 There is no similar
provision in the Illinois laws and the City of Chicago probably does
not have the right to waive its immunity; only the State can do so.2 9
The indemnification statute enacted by the state legislature does
not remove Chicago's formal immunity from liability, but merely
renders the City an indemnitor of the police officer. The ordinance,
howevbr, goes further by providing that the City pay a judgment
entered in favor of an injured party, even though thie judgment has
not yet been paid or is in fact uncollectible from the policeman.
The ordinance serves a useful purpose in avoiding circuity of
action, protecting the injured party, and facilitating settlements.
Its validity, nonetheless, is in doubt. The General Assembly should
amend the indemnification act to specifically authorize the City of
Chicago to compromise and settle claims in advance of the trial
of the claim against the policeman.
The question of the desirability of the statute still remains. The
Gaca majority opinion observed that the indemnification statute
enables the police officer to carry out his duties without being deterred by the knowledge that if he makes a mistake he may be
called upon to pay a substantial judgment. This presumably is to
produce public benefit by incr.easing the efficiency of law enforcement. But such "peace of mind" may have harmful effects as well.
So long as the policeman is not guilty of "willful" misconductacts motivated by actual malice-he may receive the benefits of
the statute regardless of the nature of that misconduct. The police25. 18 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §53.28 (3d ed. 1950). Adams v.
City of New Haven, 131 Conn. 552, 41 A.2d 111 (1945); Lambert v. City of New
Haven, 129 Conn. 647, 30 A.2d 923 (1943).
26. 348 Ill.
App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952).
27. 262 N.Y. 61, 186 N.E. 203 (1933).
28. New York General City Law §20(5).
29. The state can remove the right of immunity. Hansen v. Raleigh, 391 Ill.
536,
63 N.E.2d 851 (1945).
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man may qualify under the statute even when the injury is caused
by his intentional act (such as false arrest). The result is to relieve the policeman of financial liability for failure to exercise
reasonable care-e.g., in arresting a "suspect" or in driving his
police car. It is submitted that a police officer should be just as
responsible, financially as well as in other ways, to the victim of his
carelessness as is any other individual. (Whether the city should
also be liable is another question.) The imposition of financial
responsibility has as its foundation deterrence as well as compensation. While the public may be willing to accept a law protecting
diligent policemen in the faithful and careful execution of their
duties, it can have no interest in the encouragement of negligence
and irresponsibility.
Conceivably the policeman might protect himself against the
same financial risk by liability insurance. It has in fact been suggested that the statute was enacted to indirectly increase the wages
of Chicago policemen by relieving them of the heavy cost of carrying such insurance. 30 If so, a direct increase would have been preferable. For, even assuming that a policeman could obtain the
same broad coverage from a private insurer that is presently provided by the statute, the insured would be subject to important
checks on potential police misconduct: (1) fear that the company
may cancel out the policy; (2) awareness that such misconduct
may increase premiums paid by the insured and by fellow policemen who hold similar policies. In contrast to protection by a private
insurer, the protection afforded by the state under the indemnification statute is both free and irrevocable (barring, of course, legislative repeal).
Moreover, if this statute does provide a workable means of protecting the public, there does not seem to be any reason for limiting
its application to Chicago municipal policemen. The duties of the
municipal police are in large measure identical throughout the
state. The present statute does not even apply to all policemen
operating within the limits of Chicago. By limiting the application
of the statute to "members of the municipal police department,""
such policemen as the Park District police and the Cook County
32
Sheriff's police are not protected.
In summary, any good points of the statute are far outweighed
by its defects: (1) the discrimination against other police forces
with similar duties; (2) possible increased carelessness on the part
30. Gaca v. City of Chicago, 411 Ill.
146, 154, 103 N.E.2d 617, 622 (1952).
31. See note 2 stpra.
32. On the overlapping police forces in the Chicago area, see Comment, The
Effect of Decentralization in Metropolitan Law Enforcement: A Study of Cook
County Illinois, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 359 (1952).

